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UNDERSTANDING THE ORGANISATIONAL IMPACT OF ERP –
A CASE STUDY IN MANUFACTURING
Carton, Fergal, University College Cork, College Road, Cork, Ireland, f.carton@ucc.ie
Adam, Frédéric, University College Cork, College Road, Cork, Ireland, fadam@afis.ucc.ie
Abstract 
An underestimated aspect of the study of ERP implementations is the longer term impact of these 
highly integrated applications on the way that managers work. This paper reports on the changes to 
managerial decision processes arising from an ERP implementation four years prior to the study. 
Using the managers’ own description of their goals as a lens, the objective was to gain an 
understanding of the impact of enterprise integration on the capability of the firm. We found that the 
ERP system has helped the support functions of the organisation (Finance, Quality and IS) by 
standardising transaction processes and thereby increasing their administrative grasp of the firm’s 
activities (visibility and control). The benefits for managers responsible for the demand and supply 
cycles are, however, scarce. Furthermore, in a dynamic business environment where processes 
require constant tweaking to keep abreast of changes in market conditions, highly structuring 
technologies such as ERP can rapidly go out of kilter with the reality of doing business, and eventually 
hinder the flow of basic performance information. Managers lose out on the efficiency of integration 
promised by ERP because of latency in the access to key operational data.
Keywords: ERP impact, decision making, data integrity, organisational goals, latency
1 INTRODUCTION
ERP systems have been implemented by large numbers of firms with the aim of speeding up business 
cycle time and reducing the potential for error in information handling in the administration of core 
processes in the organisation. By incorporating efficient data capture and storage technology with 
powerful networking capacity, the vital transactional information is captured at source by users as an 
integral part of their work processes, and then made available instantaneously for other stages in the 
process and for management information (Kalakota and Robinson, 2001). This theoretical ideal makes 
the concept of ERP an extremely attractive one for large firms faced with on-going struggles to reduce 
costs, control large disparate entities and report detailed results to shareholders in a timely fashion 
(Holsapple and Sena, 2002).
In practice however, the mixed experience in local sub-units has prompted researchers to question how 
to ensure that a local manufacturing plant, for example, can derive benefit from the highly 
standardising approach to the management of resources contained in ERP systems (Gattiker & 
Goodhue, 2005). Proposing differentiation and interdependence as contextual factors affecting the 
eventual benefits derived, the authors show that the overall benefits derived by the plant are 
principally centred around data quality and task efficiency. The authors also demonstrate empirically 
that the degree of customisation of the application is directly related to the level of local task 
efficiency. In other words, organisations derive benefits from ERP implementations in terms of an 
increased granularity of information concerning operations, but this granularity has an impact on task 
efficiency. Local plants’ ability to derive benefit operational benefits from centralised transaction 
processing systems may depend on the fit between the standard processes and local practice. Also, the
highly detailed visibility of the steps in a business process comes at a price. ERP applications, because 
of their data hungry nature, expose implementing organisations and their staff to a double observer 
effect, whereby not only is the need for users to keep the system up to date disruptive for business
processes, but the very fact that certain activities are clearly visible in the application is behaviour-
altering and leads to goal displacement. ERP users experience significant constraints in adjusting the
evolving reality of business activities to “what the system wants”. Consequently the integrity of the 
information is increasingly dependent on virtual tools capable of re-interpreting transactional 
information from the ERP system into a “version of the truth” that is useful for management decision 
making. The development and application of these tools has consequences for the organisation in 
terms of resources, but also in terms of reporting latency, as this study revealed.
The potential of highly integrated enterprise systems for decision support must therefore be 
investigated in the light of certain factors. Firstly, when selecting and implementing an ERP system, 
companies are looking at a good fit with operations, not with the more abstract decision processes. 
Companies strive to align their ERP architectures with their operational processes, but the 
performance implications of these technical choices are often not considered (Bendoly and Jacobs
2004). Although organisations may have operational policies differing from plant to plant, and these 
differences are an accepted element of the corporate landscape, the lines are less clearly drawn around 
management decision making in general, and the manner in which managers use performance 
information from ERP systems in particular. Managers may rely on many tacit processes for key 
decisions and these processes are not necessarily analysed in detail (Lee et al., 2000), nor widely 
communicated, as their content may be of strategic importance for the firm, or of tactical importance 
to plant managers within the wider corporation. When tacit decision processes are subjected to an 
integrating force such as an ERP system, an improvement in performance may not always result.
Secondly, managers are generally concerned with the efficient use of all company resources, including 
people, capacity and materials. The data model of ERP applications is inventory centric, and therefore 
lacks the scope to be able to support managers in decisions that involve trading off the costs related to 
these different resources. 
Finally, an ERP implementation implies a certain number of assumptions about the company and how 
it operates at a specific point in time (Davenport, 1998). These assumptions may change over time, 
due to the organisation changing what it does (Lee and Lee, 2000) or reacting to new opportunities and 
threats in the market, leading to radical changes in its business model. The extension of the product 
set, or the adoption of new distribution channels are examples of “structural” process changes that 
have a clear impact on back office execution activities.
ERP systems require constant maintenance in order to keep pace with these changes. This 
maintenance tends to happen by making adjustments at the level of the data because vendors and 
consultants profess that the layers of metadata external to the ERP system are easier to change than 
disrupting the tightly linked ERP processes. In any case, the skills required to modify an ERP system 
at the process level are rare. The daunting complexity of the relational data models at the heart of these 
applications, coupled with the depth of business experience required to understand the implications of 
process changes for the business, ensure that finding and retaining such resources is an expensive 
matter. In a time when business processes were less complex, Dearden (1972) already cast major 
doubts (referring to it as “absurd”) on the ability of a group of experts to design a single system for all 
aspects of the business for this very reason.
Without the competence and resources to update the application as business processes evolve, the ERP 
experience may begin with the promise of increased visibility of operations, but rapidly deteriorate to 
a point where management information is more opaque than ever. Inevitably, this visionary initiative 
to unite disparate systems becomes itself one more legacy application, and an extremely “high 
maintenance” one.
In this paper, we present a case study of a firm in the high tech manufacturing sector which had carried 
out a global implementation of a single instance ERP system 4 years previously. The paper begins by 
considering the articulation between business processes, the decision making of managers and the 
applications that support them. It then presents our research questions and the methodology before 
presenting the facts of the case and the conclusions we have derived from them with regard to the 
impact of ERP on business processes and the knock-on effects on the decision making of managers.
2 DECISIONS, THE ERP AND THE ORGANISATION
Langley et al. (1995) have identified 3 aspects of decision making which render it a difficult area for 
empirical research, and by extension for the highly structured processes of an ERP: (1) Many 
decisions do not imply distinct identifiable choices, and are difficult to pin down, in time or in place, 
(2) Decision making processes do not necessarily proceed as a linear sequence of steps, rather they are 
driven by the emotion, imagination and memories of the decision makers, punctuated by sudden 
crystallisations of thought and (3) It is difficult to isolate decision processes, as decisions typically 
become intertwined with other decisions. In the context of an ERP implementation, these observations 
mean that envisioning the impacts of the ERP on all levels in the decision making processes of the 
firm is extremely far-reaching. Post-ERP, organisational actors may face significant changes in their 
status and positions as roles and responsibilities have been re-assigned to adapt to the new ERP-
enabled processes. At a minimum, their contribution may have changed towards less autonomy and 
less control. The decision process may have changed insofar as there are new or modified sources of 
information and / or different steps to the process. Key decisions may change as the system now 
incorporates some of the conditions and exception traps which were previously dealt with manually. 
The way most currently implemented ERP applications operate raises the question of whether 
management decisions are subject to programming, ie programmable in the sense of Simon’s (1977) 
ideas on the structure of decisions. During the implementation of an ERP system, information that was 
previously tracked manually (if at all) must now be recorded unambiguously in the system in order for 
automatic triggers to be activated allowing transactions to move on to the next stage in the process. 
Whether a complete model of the factors involved in any given decision can be proposed is not 
considered at this stage, as the focus tends to be turned towards what the application, rather than the 
manager, requires. As a result, organisational actors will find out post-implementation if all the 
relevant parameters required for their decision making purposes have been taken into account in 
setting up the application. If not, they will have to live with reduced flexibility or a workaround until 
the ERP is updated. Post go-live, the impetus and resources required to change the application 
evaporate rapidly, and the reality is that the workarounds become the rule until the next ERP project.  
Gorry (1971) argued that the expansion of information systems into higher management functions has 
resulted in an exaggerated focus on information quality, at the expense of an emphasis on decision 
making models and their components (constraints, goals and other parameters). In the case of ERP, 
this means that implementing an ERP system may complicate decision making for managers. Each 
ERP package uses operational models as underlying frameworks and these models can differ in terms 
of how they operate. Although managers may have involved in making the configuration decisions 
embodied in the business template as implemented by the ERP project team, they will usually be 
dissuaded from proposing any changes to these decisions post-implementation. Much of the 
requirement for business intelligence tools post-ERP derives from a desire to correct or clarify the 
meaning of corporate data that was explicitly hard-wired in the original process template (Carton and 
Adam, 2007). In addition, there is a wealth of information important for decision making, which lies 
outside the traditional ERP boundaries (Stefanou, 2001) in external sources, and in legacy systems. 
Finally, managers require decision making models to help them decipher the complexity of the real 
world. ERP systems, while providing solid transactional engines at Anthony’s (1965) operational 
control level, tend to increase the volume of information available to managers, but in so doing, add 
even greater complexity to decision making at the management control level.  
To conclude this argument, the use of such notions as “best practice” and “zero modifications” used 
by ERP vendors implies that the collective experience of individual business managers could not be 
more apt than the experience of the software vendor. The operational know-how and industry specific 
experience of firms can thus be superseded by canned transaction processes. This notion is perhaps 
easily sold in the boardroom, but harder to swallow when confronted on a daily basis with the issues 
arising from a poor fit between the software and the reality. The tight timescales for the 
implementation of ERP systems don’t allow an adequate margin for questioning the corporate 
template being rolled out. Managers are thus expected to take on process models that are not their 
own, with parameters they had little influence on, and with little access to management reports.
This is likely to bring significant resistance to change post implementation as observed in pre-ERP 
times by Little (1970). Such resistance to change will make the impact of ERP applications even more 
unpredictable as workarounds emerge that by-pass key stages in the application’s tightly defined 
business processes. Because of the automation of the flow of work inherent in these systems, and 
because people are compensated on their work rather then their proficiency in using information 
systems, users will do what is necessary to keep the transactions running, at the expense of data 
quality and integrity. In terms of decision making, this will have significant consequences. Pfeffer 
(1992) discusses the selective use of information in management to rationalise decision processes, and 
how, under conditions of uncertainty, individuals would prefer to use data and decision making 
processes “with which they are comfortable”. Thus, managers may continue to use their own ad-hoc
sources of data and processing routines, if they cannot easily manipulate the data in the ERP.
However, from the broader perspective of the organisation, rather than the individual, integrating 
mechanisms are adopted which increase its information processing capabilities (Galbraith, 1974).  
ERP systems are integration mechanisms in Galbraith’s parlance, allowing routine and predictable 
tasks to be automated.  As such, they may take the organisation towards Winter’s (1985) routinised or 
high volume mechanistic decision making. Winter (1985) however suggests that there should be a
conscious choice in the selection of which matters to treat mechanistically, and which to treat with 
some deliberation. It is debatable whether such selection is up for discussion in an ERP project in that 
the choices inherent in implementing and configuring ERP processes amount to suppressing the 
choices to be made by process users regarding the day to day routine work. Winter (1985) warns 
however, that as the range of situations subsumed by routines expands, and the performance of the 
systems improves, there is a corresponding reduction in awareness of the exceptions that may be 
useful or even essential to survival. This can lead to “irresponsible or slothful” inattention, whose 
consequences are “made to seem tolerable” (p. 111). 
Thus, the implementation of ERP, for all its merits in standardization and centralization terms, may 
have unpredictable effects on the local decision making abilities of the firm. Existing research is 
primarily carried out at the level of firm level benefits, rather than at the level of operational process 
level (Cotteleer and Bendoly, 2006). Not only are there many factors involved in the achievement of 
these benefits, the range of operational activities touched by these cross functional systems precludes 
all but a cursory empirical approach at the transactional level. In an effort to provide definitive leads 
for managers involved in implementing ERP, a case study was carried out in a firm with a mature ERP 
application to study in detail the impact of these applications on the repetitive decision making 
routines in key areas of the manufacturing organisation. In so doing, the authors provide suggestions
for how organisations can equip themselves to support managers in deriving benefit from integrated 
enterprise applications.
3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE, QUESTIONS AND METHODS
An information system by definition supports the centralisation of control (Markus & Robey 1988). 
Multi-national companies have been implementing integrated enterprise wide systems such as ERP for 
more than a decade, with a view to reaping the rewards of the increased visibility of operations that 
these applications offer. In this research, an in-depth case study of a successful multinational company 
(MNC) was used to explore the role of integrated enterprise applications in supporting managerial 
decision making. One of the challenges of research into the impact of integrated applications such as 
ERP is to properly identify where this impact should be measured (firm level or process level, for 
example), and also where the root cause of “issues” lie. Problems in decision making may be 
expressed by managers without reference to ERP systems specifically, and some of the constraints 
may arise from legacy applications, or from the complexity of the technical architecture in place, 
including the use of multiple data warehouses for management reporting. Managers understandably
show different levels of trust in, and understanding of, these new sources of data. 
The aim of this study is to focus on the role played by mature ERP systems in supporting day to day 
decision making for managers. By removing the focal point from the ERP project itself, the emphasis 
is removed from the implementation choices made by the firm in adapting the ERP solution to their 
needs. Improved decision making is rarely a stated objective of these projects, thus the goal of the 
research is not to measure implementation success. On the contrary, the goal is to investigate, once the 
dust has settled on the ERP implementation, their longer term contribution to management’s ability to 
make decisions. 
Qualitative data can help researchers understand the dynamics underlying complex relationships, that 
is, the “why” of what is happening (Eisenhardt, 1989). The approach adopted in this research was to
triangulate views of key decisions from the different functional managers involved. It was felt that this
qualitative approach represented a non-judgmental, exploratory way for managers, who have 
themselves internalized the logic of the “way things are done”, to elucidate their own decision patterns 
and biases. For example, extreme pressure on the sales order fulfilment cycle at quarter end is an 
observable management headache. However, it is difficult (for all concerned) to identify the causality 
relationships between the variables involved, or to delineate definitively between the effects of 
transaction volume, administration inefficiency or information system shortcoming. 
Single case studies pose an additional challenge of extricating the findings from their specific 
organisational context towards generalisable principles. This risk of bias was attenuated by a number 
of factors. Firstly, ERP packages are based on a common view of the underlying business model. The 
gaps between this model and the way companies operate may vary from case to case, but the latency 
impact on decision making is comparable. Secondly, publicly quoted MNC’s operate under the 
scrutiny of the Stock Exchange, and the top-down pressure on keeping inventory and costs low, while 
maintaining profit margins and customer satisfaction, is universal. Finally, managers are faced with 
the same daily high level challenges in any business, ensuring resources are being used efficiently and 
effectively in the execution of these corporate objectives.
The research objective was operationalised into 3 separate research questions which yielded a 
complete picture of the “footprint” of ERP in different aspects of the managers’ responsibilities.
Research Question 1 was concerned with discovering the goals pursued by the different functions.
The crucial point was to understand how these goals were operationalised, and what managers were
expected to deliver. Research Question 2 was concerned with a more granular view of the execution 
of these goals by analysing what decisions managers made on a day to day basis, and their perceptions 
of what the critical issues were. Research Question 3 drew on the output from Question 2 and 
explored the footprint of ERP in the decisional domains thus identified. Here we sought to gauge the 
value of a mature ERP implementation in the map of managerial decisional activity.
These questions were investigated during an in-depth field study of SIT Ltd (not the company’s real 
name), a large multinational manufacturing organisation. From April to August 2005, 50 interviews 
were carried out with middle and senior managers in all functional areas that were impacted by ERP, 
covering manufacturing operations in Ireland and the US, as well as corporate headquarters in the US
(see Table 1). SIT went live on their ERP system in October 2001, so these interviews reflected the 
views of managers using a relatively mature system, which is why this firm was selected.
Interview table SIT Ltd
Cork Boston Total
Finance 5 9 14
Manufacturing / Distribution 13 6 19
Sales 4 3 7
IS 4 2 6
Engineering 2 2
HR 2 2
Total 30 20 50
Table 1. Breakdown of interviews by functional area. 
The interviews were recorded and transcribed, yielding over 250,000 words of material. An extremely 
high level of access was gained in this firm, and the experience of these managers can be heard in the 
language used regarding goals, decisions and issues. In analysing these observations, the meaning was 
retained by returning to what was actually said, rather than the researcher’s interpretation of the same. 
An example will illustrate the point, where a Cork based purchasing manager is talking about the point 
of departure between data driven decisions and real life:
… you have vendors that don’t have anything in capacity, so therefore, at a point in time, 
which comes before you actually get a sales order, you are going to have to make an 
intellectual decision, to say, yes, go and build it, yes, go and position it.
In this example, the slightly unusual use of the term “intellectual” implies intuitive, gut-feeling 
decision making, the subject of Research Question 3, but might easily have been overlooked if not 
captured verbatim. Many such examples of embedded meaning justified the transcription effort.
On the other hand, a robust and unique coding methodology was applied to reduce the data and avoid 
data analysis paralysis (Yin, 1989). Observations from the transcripts were extracted to a matrix 
structured by research question, yielding a total of 1,845 observations. Cell entries were either direct 
quotes from transcripts or more often a summary of the issue raised. Using hyperlink functionality 
each extracted observation was linked dynamically back to the original transcript, thereby retaining 
richness and avoiding “too thin cell entries” (Miles & Huberman, 1994).
These observations were coded at three levels, identifying the interviewee, the business process 
commented, and the theme. The business process was recorded independently of the functional 
affiliation of the interviewee. For example, observations regarding shipment decisions were classified 
as pertaining to the “Deliver” process, and were commented upon by managers from Finance, 
Materials, Manufacturing, Distribution, and Sales. The themes began as a set of 13 seed categories, 
developed from the literature review, and complemented by themes which emerged from the data. 
The next section outlines the background to SIT as a company and the context of the ERP 
implementation.
4 CASE STUDY BACKGROUND
The market leader in data management solutions, SIT sees itself as specialising in helping customers 
to derive more value from their corporate data. The company is following an aggressive growth, with 
17% growth in consolidated revenue in 2005, which was the year in which the case study was carried 
out. Revenues have since then continued their upward growth trend, topping $11.2 billion in 2006. SIT 
Ltd employs over 26,500 people in 52 operations worldwide. Manufacturing is concentrated in three 
sites, one of which is Cork.
From mainframe storage systems in the late 80’s to platform independent network products by the mid 
90’s, SIT has evolved into a “solutions” company, delivering not just hardware, but also information 
“lifecycle” tools and consulting services. A key complexity of this trend towards full service offerings 
is the management of the information flows related to executing a single customer order, which 
increasingly is constituted of hardware, software and services. Many of these revenue lines are 
executed by multiple locations, over different time horizons, yet the customer will require a single 
sales order, single invoice and single goods shipment.  
SIT implemented a single instance global ERP system in 2001. This big bang implementation 
addressed user requirements for transaction processing in all back office activities relating to sales 
order processing, manufacturing, materials planning, distribution and finance. The Oracle based 
system supports 4,500 users in 52 countries worldwide, 3 of which involve manufacturing operations.
Sales demand is focused through the ERP based quotation and sales order processing system. 
Although a “build to plan” operation, SIT suffers from the hockey stick effect on sales, whereby the 
majority (>80%) of orders only become firm in the final 2/3 weeks of the quarter, which places 
enormous pressures on managers, operators and systems. One of the key issues of this case is whether 
the ERP application helps managers to cope with this pressure or aggravates it.
The next section presents the case study according to the three research questions outlined above.
5 FINDINGS OF THE CASE STUDY
5.1 Research Question 1: Organisational goals
SIT is characterised by a “stretch goal” culture, whereby top management communicates high level 
goals in terms of revenues and product mix at quarterly shareholder briefings. This communication 
draws a line in the sand both for the sales organisation and the three manufacturing operations and 
their respective supply chains. Goals and budgets are disseminated downwards through each 
functional organisation and geography. Manufacturing are driven by product availability plans, sales 
are driven by revenue targets, and Finance are driven by external shareholder expectations of revenue 
and profitability.
The goals are subject to frequent change, depending upon the messages that company officers wish to
transmit to the stock market regarding SIT’s performance, or according to unpredicted trends in 
demand. At an operational level, these changes directly influence managerial decisions (concerning 
the disposition of resources) and operational decisions (which products to ship). Changes to goals 
seem to permeate right down to the execution level, where distribution and customer operations are 
making decisions on what backlog orders to ship based on sales targets. These targets are viewed 
simultaneously by revenue, margin, product and geographic region.
A key issue in achieving corporate goals is that revenue targets use average prices which don’t capture 
either the complexity of the products or the seasonality of sales activities. SIT’s data storage solutions 
are required to fit the customer’s specific technical infrastructure, thus the products are highly 
configurable, and consequently the sales procedure for higher end solutions can be long. Furthermore, 
with hockey stick pressure on sales reps to close their deals in the current quarter, the actual price on 
any given customer order can vary considerably as the bargaining power of customers increases.
The pressure on distribution and managers increases with the seasonality of the business. Requiring 
simultaneous access to information on units shipped and consequent revenue attainment, managers at 
the plant find themselves running “blind”, that is transacting shipments to execute on customer orders 
but missing the visibility of these shipments from a reporting perspective due to systems latency. 
Thus, the SIT case illustrates the trend in multinationals towards a culture based on a “load and chase” 
philosophy. High level goals are set at the beginning of the period and communicated broadly, being 
thereafter treated as set in stone. Variations in demand, on the other hand, cause uneven patterns of 
operational activity and place huge strain on the execution organisation. Reacting to actual versus plan 
updates becomes an onerous part of execution activity, as distinct from simply dealing with execution 
issues. Exactly how this decentralisation of responsibility impacts the decision making of managers is 
explored in the next section.
5.2 Research Question 2: Management decisions
The key management decisions at the SIT manufacturing plants and at headquarters level are 
concerned with how to orchestrate the increasingly multi-source supply chain to meet customer 
demand effectively, whilst keeping costs at a minimum. For the execution side of the business, this 
means guaranteeing the availability of raw materials to production, ensuring procurement stays in line 
with the build plan and actual demand, dealing with production contingencies that affect capacity or 
yield, and prioritising customer orders for shipment, all this with minimal stock levels. Four principal
questions summarise these decisions, what to plan, what to buy, what to produce and what to deliver. 
5.2.1 What to Plan and what to Buy
The basic planning decisions concern what quantities of raw materials to purchase and what 
production schedule to follow in order to meet the material availability goal specified in the build plan. 
These decisions entail a high degree of visibility of current sources of inventory, in all its forms, and 
planned product build levels, in sufficient details to be able to break out component requirements. 
Alternate sources of supply are managed through the Bill of Materials, and buyers must be prepared to 
take into account component level revisions and quality issues arising from the test process. As SIT’s 
high end products have long lead times, planners, and consequently buyers, are working in a “build to 
plan” mode where key purchasing decisions must be made in the absence of actual demand data. For 
mid- and lower-range products the lead time is shorter, but the volumes are greater.
Product goes out to, and comes back from, a variety of sources, including vendors for normal receipts 
and re-worked material, customers with material on loan or evaluation, and internal customers such as 
engineering and customer service. Planners need visibility of all these potential sources of demand and 
supply, and a custom solution was built to accommodate the functionality that an ERP system could 
not handle. Even with this custom built tool, much of the decision making is off-line, as one materials 
manager in Cork commented:
Well, you know, you’re always going to have to be intuitive anyway. But what you are doing is 
you’re making your intuitive decision in your brain, but you’re inputting it into the tool
Once materials have been made available to production, Assembly & Test kicks off and the decisions 
for managers become more focused on capacity, yield and achieving the build plan.
5.2.2 What to make
The manufacturing mindset at SIT is focused on “not being the obstacle” to the company achieving its 
revenue target because of product availability. The build plan for high end products is executed 
“blind” in terms of what product configurations will actually be specified by customers on sales 
orders. Management decisions revolve mostly around the impact of quality issues or build plan 
changes on capacity (equipment, space or labour) because all products are manufactured “fully 
loaded” and then de-configured to fit customer orders as needed.
Purges due to quality issues and product revisions are daily occurrences for manufacturing managers. 
For example, there can be as many as 40 “up-revs” a week (suppliers deliver upgraded versions of 
their components). In these cases Engineering will require an immediate snapshot of all affected 
inventory. Decisions on what, when and how to purge are evaluated in terms of impact to the build 
plan, but also in terms of individual customer commitments.
The effect of dealing with the various contingencies in manufacturing is often to push the problems to 
the back end of the quarter, as one manager described it:
I think the reality is, as the problems arise, inevitably all the people will tend to back-end it on 
the quarter, and we will have more to do later in the quarter than previously considered.
Once goods have made it through manufacturing to the finished goods area, they are now in a position 
to be allocated to sales orders, which is the responsibility of the Distribution organisation.
5.2.3 What to deliver
Distribution is focused on achieving the revenue target and clearing the backlog of approved orders. 
Although sales are satisfied once revenue targets are achieved, unfulfilled orders in backlog are seen 
as revenue “left on the shelf”. This means delivering customers everything ordered within the commit 
dates, no matter how late orders are received. This implies a radical shrinking of process cycle time at
quarter end, with orders turned around in a fraction of the time it normally takes. There is even a “Day 
32” customisation to the ERP system which allows orders to be physically shipped in time for quarter 
end, but allowing the related keying of the transactions on ERP to happen the next day.
SIT have an essentially manual sales order allocation process for higher value sales. Instead of sales 
orders being assigned to finished goods, it is the other way around, whereby managers run through a 
list of finished goods, allocating them to sales orders. Once the “best match” has been found for a 
product and corresponding sales order, and sales operations are satisfied that this deal represents the 
optimal use of that inventory (in terms of revenue and margin), then technicians manually de-
configure the product in question to the sales order, and the order can move on to shipment. 
The task of managing shipments in this way has become much more complex due to the range of 
products sold. The price book now contains 1400 products. Fulfilment of an order might conceivably 
involve physical product coming from many different places, including some third party product. This 
is a mindset change for distribution, who are used to physically handling everything that goes out the 
door, and also a process challenge, as the ERP based shipping process is based on a presumption that 
an order is entirely shipped from one location. 
Meanwhile sales operations, a sales support group working alongside their colleagues in Distribution, 
but reporting to the Finance organization, are concentrated on trying to get the “highest dollars out”. 
This implies not simply reducing backlog, but reducing it in an order of priority which optimizes the 
chances of hitting revenue targets for the different lines of the business and reduces the risk of the 
corporation being penalised on the stock market. 
5.3 Research Question 3: ERP value in managerial decision making
ERP has had a huge positive impact, particularly in the corporate finance area, where month end close
has been reduced to a matter of days. The immediate integration of the expenditure activities of newly 
acquired companies is only possible because of the global Chart of Accounts and standardised 
purchase requisition processes offered by the ERP system.
Nevertheless, at a local manufacturing level, it is highly debatable whether the ERP investment can be 
considered beneficial. The latency in transaction processing time (up to several hours at quarter end), 
the failure to use MRP (because it does not understand the full complexity of SIT’s Bills of Materials), 
the inability of ERP to give a true and accurate picture of all inventory (because of units that are being 
reworked or on loan to potential customers), have diluted the contribution of ERP in manufacturing. 
Managers were asked about the value of ERP across the different processes investigated at SIT. Table 
2, where “-“ denotes negative opinions, “+” denotes positive opinions and “=” denotes neutral 
opinions gives a summary of the quantitative analysis of the interview transcripts. The table shows the 
dominance of negative opinions on the impact of ERP (68.5%) and the polarisation around negative or 
positive opinions (less than 2.8% of references to the value of ERP in terms of the key business 
processes were neutral). The largest proportion of negative opinions were concerned with the value of 
ERP to the “deliver” process (89%), which comes as no surprise given the still largely manual process.
ERP impact by Business Process - + = Total
Plan 13 6 1 20
Buy 20 10 30
Make 50 28 5 83
Deliver 103 13 7 123
Quote to cash 71 26 97
Report 87 63 2 152
Approve & Pay 20 8 28
Forecast 8 2 10
Total 372 156 15 543
Table 2. Footprint of ERP by process at SIT
Thus, ERP is a poor fit to SIT’s most transaction intensive business processes, notably production 
planning, MRP, procurement and sales order execution. Furthermore, management information at SIT 
transits via a number of custom-built data warehouses, each of which has different refresh rates from 
the ERP production data (varying from every 10 minutes, to every 8 hours, to every 24 hours). Thus, 
despite the existence of a centralized repository for all transactional data, SIT managers are in a 
quandary regarding reporting, as one corporate controller described it:
We need to have one source of information, you can’t use your version of the truth, and my 
version of the truth, we spend all our time reconciling to each other’s reports
This complex and centralised technical architecture means that in practice, if managers are not 
physically close to the ERP support organisation (at corporate headquarters in Boston), the chances of 
obtaining the reports they require for decision support are slim. At the time of the case study, three 
years after go-live, some Cork managers had system modification requests still pending development. 
Even corporate finance found it difficult to retain the skills necessary to exploit he richness of 
information held in the ERP system. These highly skilled resources are tied up in the sort of low-value 
and repetitive data reconciliation work that the ERP system was destined to eradicate. In SIT, as in 
many organisations, the information required by managers to make decisions is contained in a number 
of systems, including the enterprise systems such as ERP, associated data warehouses and manual 
tools such as spreadsheets. The more systems involved, the greater the information latency. Equally, 
the multiplication of systems introduces data integrity issues.
The ERP system has allowed the firm to face up to accelerated flows of transactions and supported the 
constant growth of the business over a 4 year period. However, at the time of the case study, the 
systems were again beginning to grind to a halt at quarter end.
6 LESSONS FROM THE CASE STUDY
The data integrity brought about by the ERP system at the time of implementation has removed some
of the dead time involved in arguing about data integrity, and in-so-doing it gave managers more time 
to focus on more value-adding activities. A Senior VP for Finance described the benefit and its 
reliance on people thus:
Finance is able to spend more of its time in analysis and less arguing about the validity of the 
data. Analysis is extremely powerful and investigative, we need smart people (…) to drive it.
On the other hand, plant level managers are limited in their ability to exploit ERP to investigate the 
causes of variances in operational performance. This study highlights a number of barriers to site level 
managers exploiting the richness of information held within the ERP system:
• Lack of local skills (detailed knowledge of the business processes and of the ERP configuration)
• Consequent inability to reconstitute meaning from the transactional data extracted from the ERP 
structure, or to integrate it with data from other sources
• Lack of access to data (access to production data is more or less proscribed)
• Process latency resulting from the poor fit of the ERP with the specificities of certain business 
processes (the application doesn’t capture the necessary detail, or too much detail)
• Latency in providing the required data because of the technical infrastructure
Plant level users are left on their own to master the information held in the ERP, and yet very few have 
the requisite level of access (or skills) to explore the possibilities of using the data to support 
management questions. Standard reports are often ignored, by both users and IT, and there is a 
commonly held belief that “if it’s not in a spreadsheet then it’s not acceptable”, which is paradoxical 
in an ERP-enabled business. To conclude, there is a multi-faceted gap between the information 
required to put together managerial metrics and the information and functionality available 
automatically in ERPs. 
7 FURTHER RESEARCH
This research validates the approach of using business processes, and the detailed steps within those 
processes, as the unit of analysis in measuring the impact of these hugely integrated applications. The 
organisation is extremely diverse, and ERP systems touch so many different functional areas, that it is 
impossible to decipher their impact without descending into the detail of what people actually do.
A limitation in this research has been the abstraction from the detailed implementation issues faced by 
the organisation in implementing their ERP system. Specifically, during implementation, choices were 
made in the configuration, customisation and integration of the standard ERP software to work with 
legacy applications and processes for this organisation. Manager’s opinions of the role of ERP will 
therefore inevitably be coloured by factors that are outside the scope of the ERP system itself, and 
linked to the context in which the system was implemented. In this study we did not seek to 
differentiate between the contextual elements and the system itself. Instead we focused on the 
perceptions of managers, where these two dimensions are inextricably merged. In extending this 
research, it is not certain how a methodology could be adapted which would take into account the 
decisions made at implementation time. 
Further research should be oriented towards frameworks for modelling and actively managing the gap 
between business processes and the enterprise system, such that adequate resources can be deployed to 
address the gap before the benefits of a centralised IT infrastructure are frittered away in a blossoming 
of local data warehouse solutions and personal spreadsheets. This research should address the means 
the organization needs to put in place to plan for the eventual divergence of ERP systems from reality, 
and to mitigate against this gap with skills and tools. A non trivial starting point would be to design a 
framework for the tools, skills and resources capable of reporting on the gap, such that the gradual 
tendency towards system obsolescence is visible, and can be rectified on the fly. 
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